Abstract. An information theoretical game is considered where both signal and noise are generalized Bernoulli sums with upper bounds on their mean values. It is shown that a pair of Poisson distributions is a Nash equilibrium pair.
1. Introduction. We consider the following setup: an emitter transmits a signal X through a channel; a jammer sends noise Y on the same additive channel, and the received signal is Z = X + Y. The signals X and Y are assumed to be independent. The emitter wants to maximize the transmission rate i.e. the mutual information I (X; Z) by choosing an appropriate distribution of X. Conversely, the objective of the jammer is to choose the distribution of Y such that the transmission rate is minimized.
X − −−− → − −−− → Z  

Y
For continuous random variables X and Y with power constraints of the form E X 2 ≤ P and E Y 2 ≤ N, this problem has been studied by T. Cover and S.
Diggavi in [1, Exercise 1, p. 263] and in more detail in [2] . In this case the normal distributions with mean 0 and variances P and N respectively form a Nash equilibrium pair, in the sense that none of the players has any benefit of changing his strategy if the other player does not change his strategy either. The Entropy Power Inequality plays an essential role in the proof of the Nash equilibrium condition. For Bernoulli sources with addition modulo 2, the existence of a Nash equilibrium has been proved in a series of paper ( [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] and [7] ). In this paper we shall consider a similar setup with discrete random variables and usual addition. This paper follows ideas related to discrete Fisher information (see [8] , [9] and [10] ) and the results should be considered as a step in the direction of a discrete Entropy Power Inequality.
The Poisson distribution with mean value λ will be denoted P o (λ) . The binomial distribution with number parameter n and success probability p will be denoted Bi (n, p) . When no confusion seems likely P o (λ) and Bi (n, p) will also be used to denote random variables with these distributions. We denote by B n (λ) the set of sums of n independent Bernoulli random variables, each having success probability 
can be considered as a multiple access channel with m + n senders, where the first m senders want to send information to the receiver and the last n senders want to prevent the communication. We observe that we have a two-persons zero sum game with the emitter and the jammer as players.
Therefore, if there are no restrictions on the Bernoulli sums sent by the players, then the two-persons zero sum game will not reach an equilibrium. In this paper the strategies of both players are subject to constraints
where λ in and λ noise are positive constants. Thus we shall consider the case when the messages X and Y are supposed to be generalized Bernoulli sums:
The reason to allow distributions from B (λ) and not only from B * (λ) is for mathematical convenience. This game will be called the discrete transmission game. The sets of strategies are not convex so Von Neumann's classical result on existence of a game theoretic equilibrium cannot be used. The main result in this paper is that the Poisson distributions form a Nash equilibrium pair of the discrete transmission game. Thus the Poisson channel, i.e. an information channel with Poisson distributed noise, is in a natural way related to the discrete transmission game.
Results.
Lemma 1. Let S be a generalized Bernoulli sum with E (S) = λ. Then, for any k ≥ 0,
Proof. Assume that S is the Bernoulli sum n i=1 X i where X i are independent Bernoulli random variables with success probabilities Proof. Let G be the set of random variables of the form S + P o (µ) where S ∈ B ∞ (λ − µ) . First let us prove that G is closed. There is a correspondence between distribution of random variables of the form S + P o (µ) and the set of decreasing sequences (p i ) i∈N such that
The set of such sequences is compact when it is equipped with the topology of pointwize convergence. The mapping from sequences to distributions of the corresponding Bernoulli sums is continuous. Therefore G is compact and therefore also closed.
Now we have to demonstrate that for any element S + P o (µ) ∈ G there exists a sequence of Bernoulli sums (S n ) n∈N with S n ∈ B n (λ) such that the distribution of S n converges to the distribution of S + P o (µ) . The Poisson distribution P o (µ) can be approximated by a sequence of binomial distribution Bi (n, µ/n) , and therefore it is sufficient to prove that S ∈ B ∞ (λ − µ) can be approximated by Bernoulli sums. Assume that S = ∞ i=1 X i where X i are independent Bernoulli random variables with success probabilities p i = P (X i = 1) . Then To prove this it is sufficient to check that
We need the following extension of Hoeffding's theorem [11, Theorem 3] .
Lemma 3. If S ∈ B (λ) and f is a strictly concave function, then E [f (S)] is minimized for S ∼ P o (λ) .
Proof. Assume that E |f (P o (λ))| = ∞. The function f is concave and therefore it
is upper bounded by a linear function. Thus the positive part of f is upper bounded on R + by a linear function and therefore the mean value of the positive part is bounded, and the mean value of the negative part must be unbounded. This implies that E [f (P o (λ))] = −∞, and this bound is obviously minimal.
Assume that E |f (P o (λ))| < ∞. Let P n be a sequence of distributions of Bernoulli sums converging to Q. Then
and by the dominated convergence theorem
] is a continuous function with a compact domain and thus has a minimum.
Assume that the minimum is reached at a generalized Bernoulli sum S of the form T + U where T is a Bernoulli random variable with success probability P (T = 1) = p and U is an independent generalized Bernoulli sum. Then
Now, replace T by a random variable V ∼ Bi (2, p/2) . This random variable has the same mean value as T and
Equality holds if and only if p = 0. Thus, at the minimum all the Bernoulli random variables in the generalized Bernoulli sum are deterministic and S ∼ P o (λ) .
The following theorem is a slight extension of theorems in [12] and [13] .
Theorem 4. In the discrete transmission game the Poisson distribution is the optimal input distribution for any noise distributed according to a generalized Bernoulli
sum, i.e. P o (λ in ) = arg max X∈B(λ), λ≤λin I (X; Z) .
Proof. Rewrite the mutual information as
We look for the distribution of X which maximizes
, and therefore we may assume that E (X) = λ in . Put f (k) = log (Pr (P o (λ in ) + Y = k)) . All Bernoulli sums are log-concave [12] and therefore the same property holds for generalized Bernoulli sums. According to [14, Theorem 6.1] it is sufficient to prove that E (f (X)) is minimal for the Poisson distribution, but this follows from Lemma 3.
Knowing that the Poisson distribution is the optimal input distribution, we choose a Poisson input, and look for the optimal noise from the jammer's point of view. For λ ≥ 0 we denote by P λ k the point probabilities of Y + P o (λ) , and remark that these probabilities satisfy the following differential equation
Therefore the entropy satisfies
and note that Q λ k is a sub-probability measure (
. Now we write
. Thus, the mutual information to be minimized can be written as
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